(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload

View the book

item image

(~60 pg)Read Online
(3.6 M)PDF
(2.9 M)B/W PDF
(279.7 K)EPUB
(~60 pg)Kindle
(~60 pg)Daisy
(114.4 K)Full Text
(1.6 M)DjVu


All Files: HTTPS Torrent (2/0)

Help reading texts

Resources

Bookmark

Why not a political Coase Theorem? : social conflict, commitment and politics (2002)



fullscreen
Author: Acemoglu, Daron; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Publisher: Cambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Language: English
Call number: 51808129
Digitizing sponsor: Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries
Book contributor: MIT Libraries
Collection: mitlibraries; blc; americana

Full catalog record: MARCXML

[Open Library icon]This book has an editable web page on Open Library.

Description

"November 9, 2002."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 40-45)

Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions, in contrast to what would be suggested by a reasoning extending the Coase Theorem to politics? Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions because of differences in the beliefs and ideologies of their peoples or leaders? Or are inefficiencies in politics and economics the outcome of social and distributional conflicts? This paper discusses these various approaches to political economy, and develops the argument that there are strong empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that inefficient policies and institutions are prevalent, and that they are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups holding political power, at the expense of the society at large. At the center of the theoretical case are the commitment problems inherent in politics: parties holding political power cannot make commitments to bind their future actions because there is no outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such arrangements. Keywords: Political Economy, Institutions, Commitment, Social Conflict, Belief Differences, Appropriate Institutions, Economic Development, Colonialism. JEL Classification: H2, N10, N40, O1


Be the first to write a review
Downloaded 122 times
Reviews

Selected metadata

Page-progression: lr
Scanningcenter: boston
Mediatype: texts
Identifier: whynotpoliticalc00acem
Scanner: scribe2.boston.archive.org
Ppi: 300
Camera: Canon 5D
Operator: scanner-sia-samiean@...
Scandate: 20110430013347
Imagecount: 60
Identifier-access: http://www.archive.org/details/whynotpoliticalc00acem
Identifier-ark: ark:/13960/t5fb5xk5r
Bookplateleaf: 0003
Ocr: ABBYY FineReader 8.0
Sponsordate: 20110430